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Banking Crises 
around the World
Different Governments, Different Responses
By Silvio Contessi and Hoda El-Ghazaly
T
he latest U.S. financial crisis is one of many in the recent  
economic history of both advanced and emerging economies.  
Each crisis is somewhat unique and is triggered by different  
processes and events.  However, some common elements can be 
identified in the way different governments intervene to help  
financial sectors return to health and to soften the economy-wide 
impact of the crisis. 
Central banks tend to adopt measures that provide liquidity to 
the system and that can be considered as part of a broader mandate 
to carry out monetary policy.  In contrast, governments and parlia-
ments tend to design and implement programs that provide more 
direct support to specific industries and occasionally to specific 
institutions; these programs are more properly associated with fis- 
cal policy intervention.  This article will focus on the latter: direct 
support to commercial banks and savings institutions.  The article 
will compare the United States’ Capital Purchase Program (part of 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program) with capital-injection programs 







































10   The Regional Economist  |  April 2011 The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   11
Banking crisesMost of these programs are often justified 
politically by the objective of preventing or 
reducing lending declines and recapitalizing 
financial institutions, with the ultimate goal 
of alleviating strains in financial markets and 
restoring their functioning.  But instead of 
providing general liquidity to the financial 
system, they target specific financial insti-
tutions.  Perhaps this is one of the reasons 
why—even when they are necessary and 
eventually prove useful—they frequently face 
vocal opposition from the public.  Taxpayers 
worry that the costs of the support programs 
may outweigh their benefits and may eventu-
ally lead to higher taxes.  Economists worry 
that government intervention may plant the 
seed of future crisis by exacerbating moral 
hazard problems.
1 
It is fair to say that there is no consensus 
among economists and policymakers on  
the optimal resolution mechanisms of bank-
ing crises.
How To Define a Banking Crisis
Thanks to its expertise in monitoring 
and analyzing a large number of countries, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is 
particularly well-positioned to collect, study 
and disseminate information about banking 
crises in a comparative perspective.  IMF 
economists Luc Laeven and Fabian Valen-
cia analyzed crises between 1970 and 2007 
among a large set of countries, and much of 
what follows derives from their work.
Banking crises can occur either indepen-
dently or concurrently with a currency crisis 
(a so-called twin crisis) or with a sovereign 
debt crisis, or both.  
How are these crises defined?  In a  
systemic banking crisis, a country’s finan-
cial and banking industry experiences a  
significant number of defaults while  
financial entities face vast problems ful-
filling financial contracts on time.  As a 
consequence, a country experiences a large 
increase in nonperforming loans, and a 
large part of the capital in the banking 
system is reduced.  Sometimes, these events 
follow a fall in asset prices (for example, 
in the real estate market) and sometimes 
overlap with runs on banks, but in order to 
be defined as “systemic,” such crises must 
involve a large number of institutions or 
cover a large portion of the banking system.  
Sweden and Latvia experienced such crises 
in the 1990s.  (A more detailed account of 
the mechanisms involved is provided later 
in this article.) 
A currency crisis is often defined as a 
situation in which a country experiences 
a nominal depreciation of its currency of 
at least 30 percent, while at the same time 
the rate of depreciation increases by at least 
10 percent compared with one year earlier.  
The collapse of the Thai baht during the 
Asian Crisis of 1997-98 is a prime example 
of a large currency crisis: The currency had 
depreciated by more than 30 percent less 
than two months after the fixed exchange 
rate was abandoned in the summer of 1997.
In a sovereign debt crisis, a government 
fails to pay its own debt, either in part or in 
full.  For example, in 1998 Russia defaulted 
on its Soviet-era debt and began restruc-
turing the components of its sovereign 
debt.  Notice that at least partial default is 
required to meet the definition of “sovereign 
debt crisis” used by the IMF.  That means 
the current difficulties experienced by some 
European countries would not qualify as a 
“sovereign debt crisis.” 
During the recent financial crisis, no twin 
or triple crisis (as just defined) has occurred so 
far.  Some European countries have experi-
enced difficulties in managing and refinancing 
their debt, but so far none has defaulted.
Many countries have experienced com-
binations of these types of crises in recent 
history.  Economists Laeven and Valencia 
identified 124 systemic banking crises, 208 
currency crises and 63 sovereign debt crises; 
the two economists observed that some 
countries were repeatedly affected by these 
events between 1970 and 2007.  One such 
country is Argentina.  Its prosperity rivaled 
that of the United States in the beginning of 
the 20th century.  Yet in the past 30 years, 
Argentina has experienced four banking 
crises (1980, 1989, 1995 and 2001).  All but 
the 1995 crisis were also currency crises, 
and one (2001) was contemporaneous to a 
sovereign debt crisis.
Argentina is not an isolated case.  The 
IMF study identifies 26 twin crises (banking 
and currency) and eight triple crises.  Over-
all, banking and currency crises were more 
frequent in the 1990s, while sovereign debt 
crises were more frequent in the 1980s. 
The recent global financial crisis wit-
nessed many countries experiencing 
banking crises.  After 2007, there were 13 
cases of systemic banking crises in which 
all countries experienced extensive liquid-
ity support, increases in guarantees on 
liabilities and significant nationalizations.  
In some cases, the countries also experi-
enced significant asset purchases (as in the 
United Kingdom and United States) and 
sizable restructuring costs.
2  During the 
same period, a smaller group of 10 countries 
experienced serious problems in its bank-
ing sectors that entailed extensive liquidity 
support and increases in guarantees on 
liabilities; in these 10 countries, there was 
only one case of asset purchases (Switzer-
land) and there were no cases of significant 
nationalization.
3
Luckily, none of these countries has experi-
enced either a currency crisis or a sovereign 
debt default since 2007.
Options for Direct Support  
in Banking Crises
Commonly adopted resolution policies 
include various types of large-scale govern-
ment intervention, such as bank closures, 
nationalizations, mergers, sales to foreigners, 
the creation of a bank restructuring agency 
and/or an asset-management company, and 
recapitalization.  Sometimes, these actions 
are accompanied by forbearance that allows 
the suspension or reduction of loan payments 
under certain circumstances and for speci-
fied lengths of time; sometimes, changes in 
loan classification and loan-loss provisioning 
are also allowed.
Often, direct government support to 
ailing financial institutions takes the form 
of recapitalization, a process in which the 
amount of debt and assets of a particular 
entity are reorganized in order to meet a 
financial goal.  The goal may be an attempt 
to limit the amount of tax owed on assets in 
hand or, as part of a reorganization, to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
Financial institutions can be recapitalized 
using a variety of measures: cash transfer, 
government bonds, issuance of subordinated 
debt, issuance of preferred shares, govern-
ment purchase of bad loans, assumption of 
bank liabilities or the purchase of ordinary 
shares by the government.
Governments intervened with some form 
of recapitalization or capital injection in 32 of 
the 42 banking crises identified by the IMF 
economists between 1970 and 2007 for which 
detailed comparable information could be 
gathered.  Recovery programs during the 
global financial and banking crisis of 2007-09 
were no different: 16 countries opted for out-
right recapitalization, with some combining a 
wide variety of asset guarantees and liquidity 
programs similar to some of the programs 
implemented in the United States.
A Sample of Past Crises Abroad
Sweden
Various economic policies adopted by 
Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged  
a sizable credit and real estate boom, in 
which house prices more than doubled 
between 1981 and 1991.  At the same time, 
the economy was becoming much more 
exposed to exchange rate risk. 
Because of Sweden’s exchange rate tie 
with Germany, when interest rates in 
Germany increased in 1990 as a result of 
unification, Sweden’s interest rates also 
experienced a rapid increase.  This tipped 
Sweden’s economy into crisis.  Real estate 
prices dropped dramatically, with commer-
cial real estate prices dropping 42 percent in 
five years and nonperforming loans increas-
ing to as high as 11 percent of GDP in 1993.
4
Sweden’s largest banks were unable to meet 
capital requirements and required assistance 
from the state.  Instead of maintaining private 
large banks and injecting capital through a 
direct support program, the Swedish govern-
ment nationalized two of Sweden’s largest 
banks and supported a third by providing it 
with a loan guarantee.  The ownership of these 
banks allowed the government to provide 
equity to ailing borrowers and restructure 
defaulting companies.  Liquidating bad assets 
took the government less than six years and 
ended up costing Sweden less than 2 percent of 
its GDP (with some estimates close to zero). 
Latvia
In 1991, Latvia gained independence from 
the Soviet Union and transitioned from a 
centrally planned economy to a market econ-
omy.  Within four years of its independence, 
Latvia had more than 60 licensed banks for 
a population of 2.3 million.
5  As government 
policy established the right for any person or 
entity to establish a bank, the motivation for 
founding a bank quickly became the ability 
governments intervened 
with some form of recapi-
talization or capital injection 
in 32 of the 42 banking 
crises identified by the iMF 
economists between 1970 
and 2007. ...
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in the financial system had emerged.  For 
the first year of the crisis (which began in 
August 2007), there were no significant 
legislative changes, perhaps because the risk 
of a major crisis seemed minimal or because 
sufficient institutional flexibility seemed to 
guarantee the ability to intervene with exist-
ing instruments.
However, the existing toolkit of support 
programs was substantially expanded soon 
enough.  By October 2008, in the midst of the 
panic that ensued after the failure of Lehman 
Bros., the Treasury proposed to Congress 
the idea of purchasing troubled assets to 
stabilize the financial system, through TARP, 
an essential component of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act.  Within a week 
of approving the legislation, the core sup-
port was refocused toward buying equity in 
financial institutions, using a new instrument 
of support, the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP), which fell under the big umbrella pro-
vided by TARP.  Within weeks, nine major 
banks received a capital injection of $145 
billion, and the idea of purchasing troubled 
assets was temporarily set aside in favor of 
buying equity.
In November 2008, one of the beneficia-
ries of the CPP, Citigroup, received a second 
round of government assistance, under 
another program of the TARP, and in Janu-
ary 2009, Bank of America also was given 
additional government support.  The new 
administration defined a set of criteria for 
“stress tests” aimed at determining the capital 
adequacy of the largest banks and presented a 
new program aimed at purchasing assets (the 
Public-Private Investment Program), which 
makes up a small percentage of TARP funds. 
Similar to other countries, U.S. authorities 
adopted a complex strategy to support the 
economy during the financial crisis; almost 
all of the policy options deployed in the U.S. 
were attempted in Japan during the 1990-
2003 period.
8
TARP eventually included 13 programs 
implemented by the U.S. Treasury.  The 
Treasury allocated $250 billion for CPP, 
which represents a large part of the total 
allocation of government funds under 
TARP ($700 billion).  Of the $250 billion 
allocated, approximately $205 billion was 
distributed to 707 institutions, largely 
toward the end of 2008 and the beginning  
of 2009, with the last disbursements occur-
ring Dec. 29, 2009.  Figure 1 plots the 
monthly number of beneficiaries (red bar), 
the total amount of gross disbursements 
(gold line) and the value of outstanding 
disbursements (gross payment net of repay-
ment, blue dots) until the end of 2010.  It 
should be noted that some financial institu-
tions—Citigroup, Bank of America, GMAC 
and Chrysler Financial—were supported 
with other TARP programs, as well. 
The pool of eligible institutions that 
could apply for CPP funds included more 
than 8,000 commercial banks, savings and 
loan institutions, and some other financial 
source:  authors’ own calculation based on data from the treasury’s transaction reports.  the capital Purchase Program (cPP) fell under the 
umbrella of the troubled asset relief Program (tarP). 
figure 1
TARP-CPP Disbursement
to access cheaper funding rather than go 
through more-established channels.  These 
private banks continued to grow with little 
supervision from the Central Bank of Latvia 
and, as a result, much bad lending took place.
The precipitating factor of the crisis 
occurred in early 1995 when the Central 
Bank of Latvia requested that all banks 
present their audited financial statements.  
The largest Latvian bank in terms of assets 
and deposits—Bank Baltija—failed to pres-
ent its statements, revealing its potential 
insolvency.  The central bank took control 
of Bank Baltija in July 1995, and a liquida-
tor took control in 1996.  Other mid-size 
and smaller banks also faced difficulties 
during this time, and several were catego-
rized as insolvent.  About 40 percent of the 
banking system’s assets and liabilities were 
impacted.
6
During the transition period, nonper-
forming loans increased throughout the 
banking sector as banks granted loans even 
to high-risk borrowers, and collections were 
made difficult by a lack of laws governing 
loan collateral.  However, a swift stabiliza-
tion policy helped restore viability to the 
banking system with the liquidation of cer-
tain banks, foreign help from the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
and a new banking law strengthening the 
central bank’s regulatory powers.  The coun-
try also established a deposit insurance sys-
tem, and the government decided to refund 
lost deposits to depositors up to a certain 
amount and conditioned on the existence of 
proceeds from the bank liquidation process. 
Argentina
Argentina has experienced four banking 
crises since the 1980s, with one triple crisis 
in 2001.  During the 1990s, the government 
transformed the banking sector through 
privatization and consolidation and allowed 
for increased entry by foreign institutions, all 
of which improved the banking system’s effi-
ciency.  However, bank profitability remained 
low, and more than 20 percent of total assets 
in 2000 were represented by government 
debt, which left banks vulnerable in the case 
of government default.
7
The triple crisis broke in 2001 when, out 
of fear from the deteriorating economic cli-
mate, people rushed to withdraw their pesos 
from the banks in order to convert them 
into dollars and ship them abroad.  The 
already ailing banks were further devastated 
when the government defaulted on its debt 
in December 2001.
As a result of the financial distress, the 
country was forced to exit its currency board 
regime, a convertibility program that tied the 
peso to the dollar at parity.  At the same time, 
the government responded to the bank runs 
by restricting withdrawals, essentially freez-
ing all accounts.  In addition, private deposits 
and credit to the private sector declined 
dramatically, which further weakened the 
ailing economy.  The resolution of the bank-
ing crisis was part of a larger set of policies 
that had to deal with the economy-wide 
crisis.  The government ended the currency 
board regime in early 2002 (allowing a mas-
sive devaluation of the peso) and eventually 
restructured its debt.  
Besides freezing bank accounts, the 
government intervention took several 
additional forms, including converting 
dollar-denominated loans and deposits from 
dollars to pesos at different rates, authoriz-
ing regulatory forbearance and a temporary 
decrease in banks’ capital, and nationalizing 
three banks and closing another.
The U.S. Experience
In the United States, the main instrument  
of direct support to banks by the U.S. Trea-
sury is within the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program.  TARP was established at the peak 
of the crisis in the fall of 2008, a bit more 
source:  Laeven, Luc; and Valencia, fabian.  “systemic Banking crises: a new Database.”  international monetary fund (imf) Working Paper 
08/224, november 2008.
figure 2
Governments’ Gross and Net Costs of Restructuring the Financial Sector
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financial institutions, those deemed strong 
enough to survive the crisis, were considered 
for direct support.  As later events showed, 
very few of the CPP beneficiaries failed in the 
period between 2008 and 2010.
9
The application process for the CPP 
involved several stages, which involved con-
sultations with primary regulators, analysis 
of their regulatory ratings and final approval 
by the Treasury.  Investment amounts ini-
tially varied from 1 percent to 3 percent of 
the institution’s risk-weighted assets (up to a 
maximum of $25 billion). 
After May 2009, some financial institutions 
volunteered to return their capital injections 
earlier than expected.  The position of repay-
ments is clear in Figure 1.  By the end of 2010, 
only one-fifth of the original pledged funds 
had yet to be returned by the beneficiaries.
Comparing U.S., Other Countries
In the 42 aforementioned banking crises 
between 1970 and 2007, the estimated cost 
of direct support recapitalization varies sub-
stantially, with gross costs (not accounting 
for repayments) ranging from an estimated 
0.28 percent of GDP in Argentina during 
the 1995 crisis to 37 percent in Indonesia 
during the 1997-98 crisis.
Initial estimates for the 2007-09 finan-
cial crises, available in another study by 
economists Laeven and Valencia, place gross 
disbursements of fiscal outlays in a range 
between 0.7 percent of GDP (Sweden) to  
13 percent of GDP (Iceland).  As some of 
these crises are still unfolding, it is possible 
that these figures will be revised upward in 
the future.
10
The study also provides interesting details 
about the median costs of a banking crisis 
to governments.  While pre-2007 crises 
entailed a smaller median fiscal cost in 
advanced economies relative to emerging 
markets (3.7 percent of GDP compared with 
11.5 percent of GDP), they also increased 
the ratio of public debt to GDP more in 
advanced economies (36.2 percent versus 
12.7 percent of GDP).  Output losses—the 
percentage deviation of actual output from 
its trend—associated to crises in advanced 
economies were also larger than in emerg-
ing economies (32.9 percent of GDP versus 
29.4 percent of GDP), although output losses 
are notoriously difficult to measure.
The gross direct fiscal cost of financial sec-
tor restructuring during the recent financial 
crisis has been estimated at roughly 5 percent 
of GDP for the U.S. (counting the $700 billion 
that was the total budget for TARP), close 
to the median across advanced countries 
that implemented similar programs during 
this crisis.  While countries like the Neth-
erlands and Iceland had sizable direct fiscal 
costs (reaching between 12 and 13 percent of 
GDP), some other advanced economies had 
substantially smaller outlays because they 
had fewer troubles in their banking systems. 
France, Germany and Sweden, for example, 
had direct fiscal costs of less than 2 percent of 
their GDP.  If only the CPP were considered 
for the U.S., the ratio for the U.S. would fall 
to approximately 1.4 percent of 2009 GDP.
A more-informative measure of the cost 
of direct support programs looks at the net 
costs, calculated as the difference between 
the amount of funds disbursed and those 
repaid to the government.  The median net 
cost across 42 banking crises between 1970 
and 2007 was 3.4 percent of GDP.  Its dis-
tribution across some of these countries for 
which data are available is plotted in Figure 
2.  In the U.S., in the unlikely case that no 
more funds are returned, the net cost of the 
CPP will remain at most 0.266 percent of 
2009 GDP, substantially lower than in previ-
ous banking crises.
11
Compared with Japan (the only other large 
economy that has experienced a widespread 
banking crisis following a housing crisis), 
the United States appears to be transitioning 
out of the crisis relatively quickly.  Although 
the U.S. has had more bank failures (mostly 
small institutions), banks have more swiftly 
repaid the majority of their CPP funds than 
have banks in Japan and other countries 
affected by banking crises. 
Silvio Contessi is an economist and Hoda  
El-Ghazaly is a research associate at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research. 
stlouisfed.org/econ/contessi/ for more on  
Contessi’s work.
ENDNOTES
 1  Moral hazard is when an individual or a com-
pany does not entirely bear the consequences 
of its decisions and, therefore, acts less care-
fully than it otherwise would, leaving another 
party (e.g., the government) to bear part or all 
of the cost of the effects of those decisions.
 2  The 13 countries are Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lux-
embourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom and the United States.
 3  The 10 countries are France, Greece, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland.
 4  See Ergungor.
 5  See Bank of Latvia.
 6  See Fleming and Talley.
 7  See IMF.
 8  See Hoshi and Kashyap.
 9  See Aubuchon and Wheelock.
 10 See the 2010 study by Laeven and Valencia.
 11 This figure is computed using the 1-4-11  
Transaction Report for the period ending  
Dec. 31, 2010, which we accessed on Jan. 18, 
2011.  The report computes the total purchase 
amount ($204.9 billion), the total repaid ($167.9 
billion), the losses ($2.6 billion) and the total 
outstanding CPP investment ($34.4 billion).
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D
uring the first year and a half of the 
business expansion, the U.S. recovery 
was characterized by below-average growth 
of real GDP, anemic job creation and a high 
unemployment rate.  It was fairly weak by 
historical standards.  Early this year, however, 
the U.S. economy seemed poised to grow by 
more than the roughly 2.75 percent growth of 
real GDP registered last year.  This strength-
ening, which is consistent with the projec-
tions of the Federal Open Market Committee 
and the consensus of private-sector profes-
sional forecasters, likely reflects a few key 
factors.  These include the economy’s natural 
built-in corrective forces and the expansion-
ary monetary and fiscal policies put in place 
to jump-start the economy.  In addition, 
financial markets have healed, and the worst 
of the housing crisis appears to be behind us. 
Key Trends Remain Positive
Last year, real GDP increased by about 
2.75 percent.  This increase was significantly 
larger than in the previous year (0.2 percent), 
but still only about equal to the economy’s 
estimated growth of potential real GDP.  
When actual real GDP and potential real 
GDP are growing at about the same rate, 
there is not much scope for improving labor 
market conditions—particularly after a deep 
recession.  Indeed, job gains were decid-
edly lackluster last year, as nonfarm payroll 
employment rose by an average of 76,000 per 
month.  Likewise, the unemployment rate 
averaged 9.6 percent in the fourth quarter 
of last year, down only modestly from a year 
earlier (10 percent).
Growth of real GDP was strengthening  
over the second half of last year after a 
springtime lull that saw the nation’s out-
put growth slip to about 1.75 percent in 
the second quarter.  Broadly speaking, the 
economy’s momentum at the end of 2010 
appears to have carried over into 2011, as 
many of the nation’s key indicators are point-
ing to a quickening in the pace of economic 
activity this year.  First, the Conference 
Board’s Index of Leading Economic Indica-
tors increased by nearly 8 percent in 2010, 
which was the largest annual increase since 
1983.  Second, productivity growth remains 
quite strong.  One immediate manifestation 
of this is reflected in strong growth of cor-
porate profits, which then helps to increase 
stock prices.  Rising stock prices against the 
backdrop of an improving outlook provide 
firms with an incentive to expand their capi-
tal stock.  Rising stock prices also increase 
household wealth, which may provide a boost 
to consumption spending.
At some point, strong productivity growth 
should lead to faster growth of real income 
and, thus, rising employment.  Indeed, 
according to the February 2011 Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, nonfarm payrolls 
are projected to increase by an average 
of 200,000 per month over the final nine 
months of this year.
Despite this robust job growth, forecasters 
expect that the nation’s unemployment rate 
will remain quite high this year (9.1 percent) 
and next year (8.5 percent).  Larger declines 
in the unemployment rate are possible, but 
probably only if real GDP increases by more 
than the roughly 3.25 percent growth that 
forecasters expect for this year and next.
Risks to the Outlook
Financial crises tend to have long-lasting 
effects.  One notable legacy of a financial 
crisis is a large increase in government debt 
to GDP.  The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) now projects that the federal bud-
get deficit will average about 8.5 percent 
of GDP for fiscal years 2010 to 2012.  This 
compares unfavorably with an average of 2.1 
percent from 1960 to 2007.  Typically, as the 
economy strengthens, the deficit naturally 
lessens as tax revenues increase because of 
rising real incomes, and government outlays 
decline as fewer individuals require unem-
ployment benefits or other forms of assis-
tance.  However, the CBO estimates that the 
lion’s share of the deficit in 2010 was not due 
to these cyclical factors.  Thus, something 
more than a strengthening of the economy 
is required to reduce the budget deficit to its 
longer-term levels.
Unless addressed promptly, these outsized 
budget deficits present several risks to the 
economy.  First, large deficits tend to put 
upward pressure on interest rates, as the 
government absorbs more of the funds avail-
able for private-sector investment.  Second, 
the threat of rising interest rates may cause 
investors to either sell their existing holdings 
of government securities or refrain from pur-
chasing newly issued securities.  Finally, the 
prospect of large future budget deficits may 
cause households to save more in the present 
in anticipation of higher future taxes.  The 
prospect of higher future corporate tax rates 
might also cause businesses to cancel or delay 
capital investment projects.
The sooner that governments at all levels 
return their finances to sustainable levels, 
the better off the economy will be for the 
long haul. 
Kevin L. Kliesen is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/kliesen/ for more on his work.
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